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Abstract 
Education yields substantial non-monetary benefits, but the size 
of these gains is still debated. Previous studies, for example, 
report contradictory effects of education and compulsory 
schooling on mortality – ranging from zero to large mortality 
reductions. Using data from 19 compulsory schooling reforms 
implemented in Europe during the twentieth century, we 
quantify the mean mortality effect and explore its dispersion 
across gender, time and countries. We find that men benefit 
from compulsory education both in the shorter and longer run. 
In contrast, compulsory schooling reforms have little or no 
effect on mortality for women.  
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1. Introduction  
The returns to education have long been of central interest to researchers and 
policy-makers alike. More recently, attention has turned to the various non-
pecuniary benefits of education that accrue above and beyond the monetary 
returns. Among those are more stable marriages, lower crime rates, better 
parenting and improvements in health (e.g. Haveman and Wolfe, 1984; 
Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011).  Many researchers believe these additional 
benefits are even larger than the monetary gains from education.  
The size of these additional gains from education is however, still debated. For 
example, it is well-known that education shows a strong empirical correlation 
with various health measures and mortality (Grossman 2006; Cutler and 
Lleras-Muney, 2010). A key challenge however, is to find credible variation in 
education to identify its causal effect on mortality or other health measures.  
Some studies have exploited changes in compulsory schooling laws which 
generate exogenous variation in schooling at the lower end of the educational 
distribution. Using data from different countries and time periods, the 
literature finds conflicting results. Lleras-Muney (2005) finds that compulsory 
schooling reduces 10-year mortality in the US by as much as 6 percentage 
points. Similarly, Cipollone and Rosolia (2009) and van Kippersluis et al. 
(2011) report significant, albeit much smaller effects for Italy and the 
Netherlands. Other studies find few or no effects of compulsory schooling on 
mortality in France (Albouy and Lequien, 2009), the United Kingdom (Clark 
and Royer, 2010) and even the United States (Mazumder, 2008). It is unclear 
whether these differences are the result of the data sources, the estimation 
approach or the particular characteristics of the reform or country it is 
implemented in.  
In this article, we use a different approach to quantify the non-monetary 
returns of compulsory schooling (and education more broadly). Rather than 
estimating the effect of a single reform in a specific country, we estimate the 
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average mortality effect of all reforms that have been implemented in Europe 
over the course of the twentieth century.  
Our multi-country setting has several advantages. First, because our data is 
harmonized across time and space, we can compare the mortality effects of 
compulsory schooling legislation across different periods and countries. The 
comparison may explain why previous studies, which rely on different data 
sources, mortality measures and estimation methods, have found such 
divergent results. Second, the estimates have broader validity as they are less 
dependent on the specific features of a single reform or the particular 
circumstances in a country. Our analysis reveals whether compulsory 
schooling reforms have any effect on mortality across a wide range of 
settings.1 Finally, we can use our analysis to explore the heterogeneity of 
treatment effects across countries and time periods. For example, the health 
benefits of education might be more pronounced in countries suffering from 
high mortality rates at the time of the schooling reform. As such, our results 
help to understand in which settings compulsory schooling may have 
beneficial effects on health.        
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. We first investigate whether there is any 
effect of compulsory schooling reforms on mortality, i.e. the reduced-form 
effect. Using a regression discontinuity design on cohort-level data, we 
compare mortality rates for cohorts who are just affected (or just not affected) 
by the compulsory schooling reform. These reduced-form results are our 
preferred set of estimates because they can be estimated for all reforms 
implemented across Europe since the beginning of the 20th century.  
For a subsample of reforms, we analyze the causal effect of an additional year 
of schooling on mortality. Here, we use the reform indicators as an instrument 
for educational attainment of cohorts just affected (or just not affected) by the 
                                                 
1 Our multi-country approach also reduces concerns about publication bias when studies that 
find a positive and sizeable effect of compulsory schooling mandates on educational 
attainment are more likely to be published than those with negative or zero effects on 
educational attainment. 
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reform. Because the data on educational attainment are taken from a different 
source than the mortality data, we implement a two sample 2SLS estimator 
(see Angrist and Krueger, 1992; Inoue and Solon, 2010). The first-stage then 
tells us whether compulsory schooling reforms in Europe raise educational 
attainment (i.e. their effect on schooling decisions and the degree of 
compliance among affected cohorts). The second-stage estimates reveal the 
health benefits of an additional year of education which can then be compared 
to other estimates of non-monetary returns to education.  
In the final step, we perform a meta-analysis to pool the evidence and estimate 
the mean effect and its dispersion across reforms, time periods and countries. 
Meta-analysis is widely used in other social sciences and medicine. It has also 
become a common tool in economics recently to pool evidence from multiple 
studies and test for publications bias (see Ashenfelter et al., 1999; Card and 
Krueger, 1995; or Chetty et al. 2012 for examples).  
We have three main findings: overall, we find that compulsory schooling 
reduces mortality for men, but not for women. For men, compulsory schooling 
mandates imply a reduction in the relative risk of dying (between age 18 and 
38) by 2.88%. These mortality effects are surprisingly similar for longer-run 
mortality. Men have a 2.88 % lower relative risk of dying between the ages 18 
and 48 (30-year mortality) and a 2.67% lower relative risk of dying between 
the ages 18 and 58 (40-year mortality). Women in contrast do not benefit from 
compulsory schooling in terms of reduced mortality irrespective of the age 
span analyzed.   
Further, we show that the compulsory schooling reforms in our sample 
increased average educational attainment by 0.42 years for men and 0.35 years 
for women. These first-stage effects are comparable to the 0.3 years found for 
a different set of European schooling reforms (Brunello, Fort and Weber, 
2009). The two-sample 2SLS estimates provide a very similar picture than the 
reduced-form, although the estimates are considerably noisier. As before, there 
is no discernible effect for women, but men benefit from additional education. 
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Specifically, an additional year of education reduces, for example, the average 
20-year mortality rate for men by 2.0%.  
Finally, we find substantial heterogeneity in mortality effects. We already 
noted the differences between men and women. Mortality reductions also 
seem to vary systematically across countries. For example, the Belgian reform 
of 1919, which raised schooling levels from 3 to 8 years of education, reduced 
the 20-year mortality for men by as much as 10.7%. Other reforms, like the 
Spanish reform of 1970, seem to have no health benefits even for men. 
Interestingly, the heterogeneity across countries is largest for 20-year mortality 
rates and smaller for longer-run mortality rates (even holding the set of 
reforms constant). The most consistent reductions in mortality (for both 
shorter and longer-run mortality) are found for the 1919 reform in Belgium 
(for men) and the 1928 reform in the Netherlands (for women). Both reforms 
increase compulsory schooling by more than one year.  
Also, mortality reductions for men are somewhat larger for reforms 
implemented prior to 1930 (that is, Denmark in 1903, Belgium in 1919 and the 
Netherlands in 1928). On average, these reforms reduce male mortality 
between the ages 18 and 38 by 6.4%. In part, the early reforms might have 
been more successful in reducing mortality because schooling levels were 
increased by more than one year (2 years in the Danish reform of 1903 and 
even 5 years in the Belgian reform of 1919). Reforms that were implemented 
after 1970 in contrast, reduce male mortality by only 1.2% (but all later 
reforms increased compulsory education by just one year).  
Taken together, we contribute to the existing literature in a number of ways.  
Our results support recent evidence showing modest, yet persistent health 
benefits for men. We further document that health benefits of compulsory 
schooling and education more generally, differ substantially by gender. Most 
studies using compulsory schooling reforms in contrast estimate the health 
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effects for men and women jointly or only analyze men.2 In addition, we show 
that not all compulsory schooling reforms are created equal though all 
typically affect the lower end of the educational distribution. Some lead to 
large mortality reductions for men, for example, in the Low Countries. Others, 
like most reforms in Southern Europe, do not seem to have any effect on 
mortality. Our evidence confirms that the conflicting results reported in the 
previous literature are not a coincidence but a systematic feature of the reform 
setting and its implementation. Finally, we also contribute to the literature on 
the non-monetary benefits of education. We quantify for the first time that the 
health benefits of education are substantial in Europe – at least for men. 
 
 
2. Data Sources  
We base our analysis on 19 national reforms of compulsory schooling that 
were implemented across Europe between 1903 and 1976. The reforms cover 
12 European regions or countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, 
England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands and Spain.3  
Compulsory schooling laws generate exogenous variation in educational 
attainment at the lower end of the schooling distribution. In our setting, years 
of compulsory schooling increase from as low as 3 years (Belgium in 1919) to 
as much as 10 years (France in 1937 or the Netherlands in 1968). The Italian 
reform in 1963, for example, increases compulsory schooling from 5 to 8 
                                                 
2 One exception that also finds no health effects for women, but positive health effects for men 
is by Kemptner, Jürges and Reinhold (2011). 
3 Several other countries (like Finland, Germany or Portugal, for example) also introduced 
compulsory schooling reforms during the twentieth century. The reforms in Finland and 
Germany were implemented at the subnational level but our mortality data is only available at 
the national level. Portugal increased compulsory schooling both in 1956 (boys)/1960(girls) 
and 1964. The proximity of the two reforms introduces confounding effects that would bias 
our estimates. Econometrically speaking, the assumption that no other event above and below 
the threshold will affect education and mortality will not be violated because some cohorts 
will be reasonably close to both reforms. We therefore excluded the reforms in Finland, 
Germany and Portugal from our analysis.  
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years affecting all children born in 1949 or later. Table 1 lists key features of 
each reform (like the year of implementation and minimum schooling levels), 
the birth year of the first cohort affected by the reform and their respective 
mortality rates. More detailed information on each reform is provided in the 
data appendix.  
To analyze whether the schooling reforms have any impact on educational 
attainment, we use data from three surveys: the European Social Survey 
(ESS), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). The ESS and ISSP are 
repeated cross-sectional surveys based on nationally representative samples of 
the population aged 18 and older (15 and older in the ESS) in more than 20 
countries (ESS) and more than 30 countries (ISSP). SHARE is based on 
nationally representative samples of the population aged 50 and older in 15 
European countries.4  
The European Social Survey (ESS) and International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP) mainly elicit social attitudes and changes in values, but 
also collect demographic information such as educational attainment, gender 
and the year of birth. We use the five available waves of the ESS that have 
been collected biannually since 2002 with sample sizes between 1,500 and 
3,000 individuals in each country and wave. For the ISSP, we use all twenty-
five waves that have been collected annually since 1985. The sample sizes in 
the ISSP vary between 1,000 and 3,000 individuals for each wave and country. 
Finally, SHARE collects information on health and socio-economic variables, 
but also on year of birth, gender and educational attainment. So far, three 
waves are available which have been collected biannually between 2004 and 
                                                 
4 We use data in the European Social Survey (ESS) for Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; in the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP), we use the data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great 
Britain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. In the 
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), we use the data for Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. 
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2008. The sample sizes range from 1,000 to 4,000 individuals in each 
participating country and wave. 
We pool data across surveys and all available waves and calculate average 
educational attainment (measured in years of schooling) for all cohorts around 
the reform date separately by gender and country.5 Overall, we have 
information on educational attainment for 27,237 women and 21,979 men 
once we restrict the sample to the 10 cohorts before and 10 years after each 
reform.  
To investigate how compulsory schooling reforms affected mortality across 
Europe, we use data from the Human Mortality Database (Human Mortality 
Database, 2011). The database contains, among others, age-specific mortality 
rates for over 30 countries from cohorts born as early as the late 17th century 
until today.6 The database uses a common methodology to convert death and 
birth counts (from official vital statistics) as well as population counts (mostly 
from national censuses) into mortality rates by year, age and birth cohort.7  
To trace mortality over the life cycle for cohorts around the reform date, we 
calculate the probability that an 18-year old dies within 20, 30, 40 or 50 years. 
We label these 20-, 30-, 40- or 50-year mortality rates. We choose age 18 as 
our starting age because compulsory schooling (affected by the reforms) is 
completed by then. The 1947 compulsory schooling reform in England and 
Wales, for instance, increases the number of compulsory years from 8 to 9. 
The reform affects all cohorts turning 14 in 1947 or later. As a consequence, 
                                                 
5 In the ESS and ISSP, educational attainment is measured as the highest level of schooling 
completed. The answer categories are country-specific and later recoded according to the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). In SHARE, educational 
attainment is measured similarly and recoded as years of education. 
6 Data for our countries and regions of interest are available for the following birth cohorts: 
Austria (1871-1980), Belgium (1765-1979), Denmark (1764-1979), England and Wales 
(1764-1979), France (1737-1979), Ireland (1871-19709), Netherlands (1777-1979), Northern 
Ireland (1847-1979), Portugal (1846-1979), Scotland (1777-1979), Spain (1822-1979) and 
Sweden (1676-1980).  
7 The database is the result of a joint effort of researchers at the University of California, 
Berkeley and the Max-Planck-Institute in Rostock, Germany. See Wilmoth et al. (2007) and 
the website www.mortality.org for further details of the raw data and the methodology used to 
calculate harmonized age- and cohort-specific death rates across countries. 
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the first cohort affected is born in 1933 and turned 18 in 1951. The 20-year 
mortality rate is then computed as one minus the probability that an individual 
survives until 1971 conditional on being alive in 1951. We calculate mortality 
rates over longer time spans, for other cohorts and schooling reforms 
accordingly.  
 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1. Reduced Form Estimates  
We first explore whether there is any effect of compulsory schooling reforms 
on mortality, i.e. the reduced-form effect. To do so, we compare mortality 
rates of cohorts just affected by the reforms to mortality rates of earlier cohorts 
that are unaffected. The reduced-form approach mirrors empirical 
specifications common in regression discontinuity designs (see Imbens and 
Lemieux 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010 for surveys). Specifically, we estimate 
the following model separately for each country and gender: 
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+×+×++++=
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(1) 
where cm  is the x-year mortality rate of cohort c. cD  is a dummy equal to 
one if the cohort is affected by the reform and zero otherwise. We exclude the 
first cohort potentially affected as not everybody in that cohort might have 
been covered by the reform. The baseline results use ten cohorts before and 
ten cohorts after the reform. We further probe the choice of bandwidth in our 
robustness analyses (see Section 4.4. below). To adjust flexibly for cohort 
trends in mortality, we use a quadratic polynomial in the year of birth cY  
(measured relative to the first cohort affected). The quadratic trend is allowed 
to differ on either side of the reform threshold. Note that estimating the effects 
for each country separately, we also account flexibly for country-specific 
cohort trends and for heterogeneous treatment effects across countries. 
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Furthermore, we run separate analyses for male and female mortality to allow 
for differences in compliance with the reform and differential mortality trends 
across genders.  
Our parameter of interest RDβ  identifies the mortality effect of each 
compulsory schooling reform among compliers (who stay in school longer 
because of the new legislation than they would have stayed without the 
reform). Under positive compliance and monotonicity, the reduced-form effect 
identifies whether there is any effect of schooling on mortality. Our results 
below report odds ratios, )exp( RDβ , which (for values close to one) 
approximate relative annual mortality risks.  
The identifying assumption we require is that cohorts born just above and just 
below the threshold face similar mortality risks conditional on flexible cohort 
trends but differ in their completed years of education.8 
 
3.2. Two Sample 2SLS Estimates 
For a subset of reforms, we have information on educational attainment of the 
affected cohorts from the ESS, ISSP and SHARE.9 We use these additional 
data to implement a 2SLS estimator of the returns to education on mortality. 
The 2SLS estimator provides two additional insights: the first-stage estimates 
show how the compulsory schooling reforms affected educational attainment 
in each country – and whether these effects are plausible. Like the reduced-
form estimates, we estimate the first stage with data aggregated to the cohort, 
gender and country level.10 Hence, we estimate a variant of equation (1), 
where the dependent variable is now average educational attainment for cohort 
                                                 
8 Differential international migration might be one potential source of bias. Clark and Royer 
(2010) however, find little evidence for confounding effects from migration in the United 
Kingdom. 
9 We have data on educational attainment covering the following reforms: Austria (1966), 
Denmark (1971), England and Wales (1947 and 1973), France (1937 and 1967), Ireland 
(1972), Italy (1963), Netherlands (1928, 1950 and 1973), Northern Ireland (1957), Spain 
(1970) and Sweden (1962).  
10 Using the aggregate data (rather than the individual-level survey data) accounts for 
clustering by birth cohort and produces conservative standard errors. 
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c and the estimation is performed separately by gender and country. The 
second-stage in turn identifies the causal effect of one additional year of 
compulsory schooling on mortality among those affected by the reform 
(assuming nonzero compliance and monotonicity as before).  
The 2SLS estimates will differ from the reduced-form estimates for at least 
two reasons: if the reform affects only few students or if not all students 
comply with the new compulsory schooling law, years of schooling will 
increase by less than the compulsory schooling reform mandates. In that case, 
the 2SLS estimate will be larger in absolute terms (more negative) than the 
reduced-form estimate, so |β2SLS|>|βRF|.11 In addition, the 2SLS and reduced-
form estimates are different because several reforms in Europe increased 
compulsory schooling by several years (see Table 1). If the reform increases 
average education attainment by more than one year, we expect the reduced-
form effect on mortality to be larger in absolute terms (more negative) than the 
2SLS estimates, so |βRF|>|β2SLS|. Note that we can implement the 2SLS 
estimator only for the 12 reforms for which we have information on 
educational attainment for all cohorts around the threshold.  
To implement the 2SLS estimator, we estimate the following model: 
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where we use the indicator for compulsory schooling reforms cD  as an 
instrument for average years of schooling cEduc  in the first stage. As before, 
we control for a local quadratic polynomial to capture secular trends in 
educational attainment and estimate the model separately for each country and 
gender to account flexibly for country- and gender-specific differences. In 
                                                 
11 With partial compliance, the first stage estimate is smaller than one. Because the 2SLS 
estimator can be written as the ratio of the reduced-form estimator divided by the first-stage 
estimator, partial compliance implies that the 2SLS estimate of equation (1) will be larger in 
absolute terms than the reduced-form estimate. 
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addition, we also include survey dummies to adjust for differences in 
measured educational attainment across the three data sources.   
The 2SLS estimator we implement is based on two different samples: the 
information on educational attainment is taken from the ESS, ISSP and 
SHARE surveys, while the mortality data come from the Human Mortality 
Database. The two-sample 2SLS estimator is consistent as long as the two 
samples are drawn from the same population (Inoue and Solon, 2010).12  
An important practical issue is how to obtain correct standard errors, because 
the first-stage and second-stage estimates are typically drawn from different 
population samples (see Angrist and Krueger, 1992; Inoue and Solon, 2010). 
The modeling choices we made in our setting, however, ensure that we obtain 
correct standard errors. The estimates in the first and second stage are based 
on the exact same set of reforms and years (since we estimate equation (1) 
separately for each reform). We further impose the restriction that the first and 
second stages use the same set of observations for each reform. Therefore, the 
marginal distributions of the instrument and control variables are exactly the 
same across the two samples.13  
 
3.3. Meta-Analysis of Reform Effects 
One advantage of our data is that we can estimate the average effect of all 
compulsory schooling reforms implemented in Europe - independent of the 
particular circumstances of a reform or the country in which it is implemented. 
To estimate the mean effect (and its dispersion), we perform meta-analyses for 
the pooled reduced-form ( RDβ ) and the pooled two-sample 2SLS estimates (
                                                 
12 Note that the 2SLS and IV estimator no longer coincide when two different data samples are 
used. Inoue and Solon (2010) recommend the 2SLS estimator, as is used here, because it 
corrects for differences in the distribution of the instrument across the two samples. 
13 An alternative approach would be not to impose the same marginal distribution across the 
two samples. This approach might generate more efficient estimates (since we use more 
information) but we would then need a bias-correction for the variance-covariance matrix like 
the Murphy-Topel estimator (originally designed to correct for generated regressor bias) 
suggested by Inoue and Solon (2010). 
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SLS2β ), respectively. Meta-analysis is commonly used in the medical sciences 
to determine whether treatment effects vary across experimental studies run at 
different locations and time periods. Here, we use meta-analysis to explore the 
heterogeneity of European compulsory schooling reforms and probe the 
external validity of previous mortality estimates.   
When pooling the evidence from different reforms, we need to weigh 
individual reform estimates to generate an average effect. Weighting can be 
done either using random or fixed effects (see, for example, Borenstein et al. 
2009). The fixed effects approach assumes that there is no heterogeneity of 
mortality effects in the underlying population; it should be used when the 
heterogeneity of estimates is low. Fixed effects assign each reform a weight 
equal to the inverse of the country’s sample variance. When treatment effects 
vary a lot across studies, random effects are more appropriate. The random 
effect approach assumes that reform effects are drawn from a normal 
distribution.14 Compared to the fixed effects approach, the weights assigned to 
each study give less weight to outliers - very large or very small study effects. 
To determine the heterogeneity of effects across countries (and hence the 
choice between fixed and random effects), we follow the literature and use as 
our criterion the I-squared. This measure is defined as follows:    
                          



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
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dfQsquaredI                                (3) 
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=
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1
2ββ   .  The weights iw  are the inverse of the sampling 
variance of study i, iβ  is the treatment effect in study i, and iβ  is the mean 
                                                 
14 In particular, it is assumed that reform effects iβ
 
are drawn from the following 
distributions: ( ) ( )22 ,~;,~ τµθσθβ NN iiii . The goal in the random effects approach is to 
estimate the mean of the distribution of effects, µ , and not a single “true” effect. The weights 
for the random effects analysis are defined as ( )22/1 τσ += irandomiw . This formula shows 
that less weight is given to “outliers” compared to the fixed effects analysis which weighs by 
the inverse of the sampling variance, 2iσ . 
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effect across all studies. In (3), df denotes the number of reforms (defining the 
degrees of freedom). I-squared varies from 0% to 100% where higher values 
indicate more treatment effect heterogeneity (favoring a random effects 
approach). Values of 50% (75%) are considered thresholds for moderate 
(large) treatment effect heterogeneity (for example, Higgins et al., 2003).  
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Reduced Form Effect of Reforms on Mortality  
 
We first investigate whether compulsory schooling reforms have any effect on 
mortality. Table 2 reports odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals for the 
reform effect on mortality in the short run (ages 18-38 and ages 18-48) and 
longer-run (ages 18-58 and ages 18-68).   
For 20-year mortality, 14 out of the 19 odds ratios are smaller than one 
indicating a reduction in mortality. For six reforms, we find statistically 
significant reform effects (at the 5% level): the 1919 reform in Belgium 
(OR=0.90), the 1957 reform in Northern Ireland (OR=0.93), the 1966 reform 
in Austria (OR=0.94), the 1967 reform in France (OR=0.95), the 1973 reform 
in England and Wales (OR=0.98) and the 1976 reform in Scotland (OR=0.94).  
To investigate longer-run effects, we analyze 30-, 40-, and 50-year mortality 
rates for reforms where we have data for 10 cohorts above and below the 
threshold. We find that increases in compulsory schooling reduce longer-term 
mortality among men as well. For 30-year mortality rates, for example, 10 out 
of the 14 odds ratios indicate a reduction in mortality; for 40-year mortality 
rates, we find that five out of eight odds ratios show a reduction in mortality. 
For 50-year mortality, five out of six estimates of the reform have an odds 
ratio close to one (indicating a zero effect). Only the 1919 reform in Belgium 
continues to have a statistically negative effect on male mortality even in the 
long-run. 
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Overall, the most consistent mortality reductions for men are observed for the 
1919 reform in Belgium and the 1928 reform in the Netherlands. How large 
are these mortality benefits for men? The Belgian reform, for example, implies 
a reduction in male mortality by 5.6% (for 30-year mortality), 4.6% (for 40-
year mortality) and 4.3% (for 50-year mortality) respectively.15 These effects 
are substantial; yet, we also need to take into account that the reform raised 
compulsory schooling by 5 years. Even the Dutch reform, which raised 
compulsory education by 2 years, however, reduced male mortality by a 
sizeable 4.4% (for 30 year-mortality) and 6.6% (for 40-year mortality) 
respectively.   
One interpretation of these findings is that compulsory schooling reforms only 
have an effect in very few countries (where reforms raised compulsory 
schooling by several years). An alternative interpretation is that the data are 
too noisy to detect an effect in some countries (where odds ratios are below 
one but not statistically significant). To explore this second explanation, we 
now pool the data across countries and use meta-analysis to estimate a joint 
effect of all compulsory schooling reforms in Europe. Figure 1 shows a forest 
plot of the individual reform effects and the pooled estimate for 20-year 
mortality rates (for which we have data for all 19 reforms). The pooled 
estimate is based on a random effects approach since the I-squared indicates 
substantial heterogeneity across estimates (i.e. we can reject the null 
hypothesis of no heterogeneity with p<0.05).16 The grey square represents the 
weight of each reform in the pooled estimation. The pooled estimate (shown 
as a dashed line) across all reforms suggests an overall reduction in male 
mortality by 2.8% (OR=0.972).17 We find very similar and also statistically 
significant effects for 30- and 40-year mortality rates, but no significant 
pooled effect for 50-year mortality rates (shown at the bottom of Table 2).  
                                                 
15 The 40-year mortality effect in percent is (1/0.956 - 1)*100 =4.6% (as the odds ratio is 
smaller than one). The effects on 30- and 50-year mortality rates are calculated analogously. 
16We obtain similar results if we use fixed effects instead. Results are available upon request. 
17The odds ratio of 0.972 implies a reduction in 20-year mortality of (1/0.972 – 1)*100 =2.8%.  
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Overall, compulsory schooling reforms seem to have substantial health 
benefits for men. In contrast, we find basically no effect for women (as shown 
in Table 3). For 20-year mortality, odds ratios of 12 out of 19 reforms are 
below one indicating a reduction in mortality. Most estimates, however, are 
not statistically significant. Statistically significant reductions in mortality 
rates are only found the 1928 reform in the Netherlands and the 1972 reform 
in Northern Ireland. Longer-run mortality shows a very similar pattern: 5 out 
of 14 odds ratios (for 30-year mortality) and 5 out of 8 odds ratios (for 40-year 
mortality) are below one - but only one or two are statistically significant. The 
one reform that consistently reduces female mortality over the life-cycle is the 
1928 reform in the Netherlands. This reform reduces female mortality by 
12.2% (for 20-year mortality), 6.3% (for 30-mortality) and 5.6% (for 40-year 
mortality) respectively. These effects are substantial. Yet again, we need to 
keep in mind that compulsory schooling was raised by 2 years and the reform 
likely had a non-trivial effect on average educational attainment.   
The meta analysis (shown in Figure 2 and the bottom of Table 3) also suggests 
no coherent effect of European compulsory schooling reforms for women. The 
pooled effects are very close to one and none is statistically significant. Hence, 
compulsory schooling reforms as implemented in Europe during the twentieth 
century seem to have little non-monetary gains (in terms of a longer life) for 
women.   
The reduced-form estimates also suggest substantial heterogeneity of mortality 
effects across gender, countries and time periods. We have already mentioned 
the differences between men and women. There are also large differences 
across reforms and countries. For example, the Belgian reform of 1919, which 
raised schooling levels from 3 to 8 years of education, reduced the 20-year 
mortality for men by as much as 10.7%. Other reforms, like the Spanish 
reform of 1970, seem to have no health benefits even for men. Interestingly, 
the heterogeneity in effects across countries is substantially larger for the 20-
year mortality rates than for longer-run mortality rates. The more 
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heterogeneous effects for short-run mortality remain even when keeping the 
set of reforms constant. For 40-year mortality, for example, the odds ratios 
range from 0.938 (the Dutch reform of 1950) to 1.129 (the French reform of 
1937); for the same set of reforms, the odds ratios for 20-year mortality rates 
range from 0.903 (the Belgium reform of 1919) to 1.348 (the French reform of 
1937).  
Also, mortality reductions for men are somewhat larger for reforms 
implemented prior to 1930 (that is, Denmark in 1903, Belgium in 1919 and the 
Netherlands in 1928). On average, these reforms reduce male mortality 
between the ages 18 and 38 by 6.4%. Reforms that were implemented after 
1970 in contrast, reduce male mortality between the ages 18 and 38 by only 
1.2%. In part, the larger mortality reductions are explained by the fact that 
schooling levels in the early reforms were often raised by several years (2 
years in the Danish reform of 1903 and even 5 years in the Belgian reform of 
1919). Alternatively, mortality improvements might have been larger for the 
early reforms because mortality rates were still at high levels early in the 
twentieth century. Yet, in additional meta-analytic regression analyses, we do 
not find any significant relationships between the sign of the coefficient β in 
equation (1), the year of the reform and baseline mortality just prior to the 
reform (not reported here).  
 
4.2. The Impact of the Reforms on Educational Attainment  
 
We next investigate how compulsory schooling reforms affect educational 
attainment for the subset of reforms for which we have data on years of 
schooling available. Table 4 reports the results of the first stage regressions. 
The estimates from our data are shown in the column labeled “First stage for 
2SLS”, the corresponding standard error in the column to the right.  
On average, the compulsory schooling reforms in Europe increases years of 
education by 0.42 years for men and 0.35 years for women (see pooled 
estimates at the bottom of Table 4). Individually, most reforms have no 
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statistically significant effect on schooling and would not pass the usual 
diagnostic checks for weak instruments.18 A few reforms show a negative 
effect on educational attainment though none of them are statistically 
significant.19  
That some first-stage estimates are noisy should not surprise us given the data 
available. We use household surveys where the number of individuals in each 
cohort-year-gender cell is relatively small (compared to the large 
administrative data sets or census data that are available in some countries). 
As a consequence, we have substantial sampling variability in the measure of 
educational attainment which will inflate our standard errors in the first stage. 
In addition, we aggregate the data to the cohort-year-gender level in order to 
be consistent with the mortality data used in the second stage. Finally, we 
restrict the first stage to only 10 birth cohorts above and below the reform 
threshold to reduce concerns of omitted variable bias (as the result of shocks 
that occurred many years before or after the reform).  
The weak first-stage estimates therefore are likely the consequence of small 
samples and potential measurement error in educational attainment in our data. 
Given that others have successfully used multiple European compulsory 
schooling reforms to study its effects on wages (Brunello, Fort and Weber, 
2009) or fertility (Fort, Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer, 2011) it does not 
indicate that the compulsory schooling reforms had no effect on educational 
attainment. We compare our first-stage results to those obtained in the 
literature to support our claim that the European compulsory schooling 
reforms had an effect on educational attainment (and are therefore a useful 
instrument to analyze the causal effect of education on mortality). The right-
hand side of Table 4 shows all available estimates of the effect of compulsory 
                                                 
18 To take one example, the F-statistic for the instrument of the 1973 reform in England and 
Wales is just 3.2 when estimating the first stage for men which is below the rule-of-thumb 
value of 10 (in the case of one endogenous variable and one instrument).  
19 Note however, that we are not the only ones finding negative effects of selected compulsory 
schooling reforms on educational attainment. Levin and Plug (1999) also report a negative 
effect of compulsory schooling on years of schooling for the 1950 reform in the Netherlands. 
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schooling reforms on schooling across Europe (under the header “Estimates in 
the literature”). Note that the estimates taken from the literature are all based 
on individual-level data of educational attainment and several authors use very 
large administrative datasets to analyze the effect on education in their 
particular country (like Albouy and Lequien, 2009; Clark and Royer, 2010; 
van Kippersluis et al, 2011).20 It is thus not surprising that the effects on 
schooling are more precisely estimated than in our data. 
It is reassuring, however, that the average effect of compulsory schooling 
reforms on educational attainment in the literature is about 0.4 years (pooled 
over all studies and genders) - which is remarkably similar to our pooled 
estimates of 0.42 for men and 0.35 for women. Overall then, our first-stage 
estimates do not seem to be out of line. We thus present in the next section the 
2SLS estimates for the effect of one additional year of education on mortality. 
 
4.3. Two-Sample 2SLS Estimates of Education on Mortality 
 
Our two-sample 2SLS estimates are based on the subset of reforms for which 
we have cohort-specific data on both years of education and mortality. We 
further restrict our analysis to reforms for which the first-stage effect of 
compulsory schooling on educational attainment is positive. We thus drop 
reforms with a negative first-stage (like the French reform of 1937 for men or 
the Swedish reform in 1962 for both men and women, for example). We also 
need to drop the earliest reforms (the 1903 reform in Denmark and the 1919 
reform in Belgium) because we have no evidence about the first-stage effect 
on education (recall that we estimate the 2SLS separately for each country). 
The restricted sample now includes the following 9 reforms for men and 10 
reforms for women: Netherlands 1928, France 1937 (women only) England 
and Wales 1947, the Netherlands 1950 (women only) Austria 1966, France 
                                                 
20 Using the aggregate data, we give an equal weight to each cohort in the estimation. In the 
micro data, the cohorts are weighted according to the number of individuals in that birth 
cohort responding to the survey.  
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1967, Spain 1970, Ireland 1972, England and Wales 1973, the Netherlands 
1973 and Denmark 1971 (men only). 
Figure 3 presents the 2SLS estimates of the effect of education on 20-year 
mortality for men. Overall the two-sample 2SLS estimates indicate a 2.04% 
reduction in relative risk per additional year of schooling for men (p<10%). 
Note that, here, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect of one year 
of education on mortality is homogenous across reforms and countries. The 
corresponding reduced-form estimates on the subset of reforms (and the 
pooled estimates) are shown in Table A1 in the appendix. The overall pattern 
is very similar across the two estimation methods: both reduced-form and 
2SLS estimates suggest that education has beneficial health effects for men. 
The two-sample 2SLS estimates are however, noisier than the reduced form 
estimates.  
Figure 4 presents the effect on 20-year mortality for women. Mirroring the 
reduced form estimates (also shown in Table A1 in the appendix), the results 
for women suggest a zero effect of educational attainment on mortality.  
As a final piece of evidence, we compare 2SLS and reduced-form estimates 
for 30-year mortality. Table 5 shows the same pattern for both men and 
women yet again. An additional year of education reduces the risk of dying for 
men by 3.84%; for women, there is no mortality effect of compulsory 
schooling reforms or additional education more generally.21 Unfortunately, we 
cannot implement the 2SLS estimator for mortality in the very long-run (40- 
and 50-year mortality). The reason is that data on educational attainment are 
only available for the more recent reforms for which long-run mortality rates 
cannot be calculated with the available data.  
 
4.4. Robustness Checks  
 
                                                 
21 For the two-sample 2SLS, the pooled estimate is 0.963 for men; hence, (1/0.963-
1)*100=3.84%. 
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In this section, we check the robustness of our results to alternative empirical 
specifications. We start out with the choice of bandwidth around the reform 
threshold (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Our identification relies on the 
assumption that cohorts just affected or just not affected by the reform are 
similar to each other in every aspect other than the reform. Hence, one would 
like to restrict the analysis to just a few cohorts left and right of the reform 
threshold. However, focusing the analysis on very few cohorts also reduces 
statistical power. The left-hand side of Table A2 for men and A3 for women 
shows reduced-form estimates using 5 cohorts and 3 cohorts on each side of 
the reform threshold (rather than the 10 cohorts used in the baseline above).  
Our identification also depends on a correct specification of other shocks 
affecting mortality. In the baseline, we use a local quadratic trend allowing 
secular changes in mortality to be different before and after the reform 
threshold. The right-hand side of Table A2 (for men) and Table A3 (for 
women) show estimates when we use a local linear polynomial or global cubic 
polynomial instead. As before, we estimate the specifications separately for 
each reform and each gender.  
Using fewer cohorts in the estimation, we still find consistent health benefits 
of the 1957 reform in Northern Ireland for men. Overall, however, the effects 
are less precisely estimated and the pooled estimates with 5 and 3 cohorts 
below and above the threshold are no longer statistically significant for men. 
For women, the results are also noisier and – like the baseline results –no 
health benefits from compulsory schooling reforms emerge.  
The alternative specifications of cohort-specific trends generate similar results 
as in the baseline. We find significant effects for a few reforms like the 1957 
reform in Northern Ireland or the reforms in the early 1970s in Northern 
Ireland (1972), England and Wales (1973) and Scotland (1976). The pooled 
estimates show a similar pattern as well with mortality reductions for men, but 
not for women.  
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Finally, there is some ambiguity how to code the reform in Denmark in the 
1970s. Some authors argue that the reform occurred in 1971 while others 
claim it was implemented only in 1975 (see data appendix for details). Above, 
we report results where the Danish reform is coded as 1971 and the first cohort 
affected born in 1957 because we find this information more convincing than 
the source suggesting 1975 as the reform year. When we code the reform as 
1975 instead (and the first cohort affected born in 1961), we find very noisy 
results for men (see Figure A1) and even an increase in mortality for women 
(see Figure A2). In sum, our robustness checks support the idea that men 
benefit from compulsory schooling reforms, while women do not.   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The starting point of our analysis was that there is still no consensus about the 
size of non-monetary returns to education. Using a comprehensive data set on 
mortality and compulsory schooling reforms implemented across Europe 
between 1903 and 1976, we investigate how these reforms – covering many 
different countries and time periods – affect mortality for men and women. 
We find that compulsory schooling reforms have reduced mortality for men 
both in the short- and long-run. In contrast, we find no effect for women. We 
further document that there is substantial heterogeneity of the mortality 
benefits across countries and time periods. Effects seem to be larger for 
reforms implemented earlier in the twentieth century.  
We further show that compulsory schooling reforms increased educational 
attainment by around 4 months for both men and women. Hence, the gender 
differences in differences cannot be explained by differential rates of 
compliance with the new schooling requirements. Gender-specific 
occupational choices and associated exposure to health hazards might provide 
an alternative explanation. For instance, male compliers, traditionally 
overrepresented in blue-collar jobs, might be more likely to find a white-collar 
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job after the compulsory schooling reform and thus be less exposed to 
hazardous working conditions. Understanding these gender differences might 
be a promising avenue to shed more light on the possible pathways from 
education to health.  
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Appendix: Reforms in Compulsory Schooling Laws 
 
We base our analysis on 19 reforms of compulsory schooling in 12 European 
countries or regions: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England and Wales, France, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Scotland, Spain and 
Sweden.  
We include all reforms implemented between 1900 and 1980 for which we 
could identify the exact year of the reform’s implementation and the birth year 
of the first cohort affected by the reform. We drop all reforms that were 
implemented since 1980 because we cannot analyze their effects on longer-run 
mortality (like 30-, 40- or 50-years mortality rates from age 18 onward) for 
those reforms. In addition, we exclude reforms that were only partially 
implemented (like the Portuguese reform in 1973) or were implemented at the 
sub-national level (for example, compulsory schooling reforms in Germany 
were implemented by individual states between 1947 and 1969; similarly, the 
schooling reform in Finland was implemented between 1972 and 1977). The 
main reason is that our mortality data is only available at the cohort level but 
does not contain any information on place of birth or place of residence while 
in school. Finally, we also exclude reforms that reduced the number of 
compulsory schooling years (like the reforms in the Netherlands in 1947) or 
reforms that were implemented during the two World Wars to avoid 
confounding effects from war-related disruptions.  
To obtain the necessary information for each reform (like the year of 
implementation, the number of additional years of compulsory schooling and 
the birth year of the first cohort affected), we start out with the comprehensive 
survey of European educational systems and major schooling reforms by Fort 
(2006). We extended the time frame to reforms prior to World War I and 
cross-checked the information for each reform using multiple sources and by 
contacting experts in the respective countries. As a result, our set of 
compulsory schooling reforms and coding of the variables differ somewhat 
from Fort (2006) and Brunello, Fort and Weber (2009). Table 1 shows the 
relevant information for each reform we use in our estimation. Here, we 
provide a brief summary of each reform in chronological order and highlight 
how we coded our reform indicator. 
 
Denmark (1903 and 1971): 
Seven years of compulsory education was introduced in 1814 and a system of 
municipal education authorities was built up. In 1903, the municipal town 
schools and grammar schools were coordinated by the Act on Secondary 
Schools. According to this act, a four-year Middle School was introduced both 
in the grammar schools and in the municipal town schools. After a test in the 
5th form, pupils could be admitted to the Middle School. After the Middle 
School examination, pupils could then leave school, continue one more year in 
the realeksamen class and prepare themselves for the lower secondary school 
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leaving examination (the realeksamen) or apply for admission to the grammar 
school’s three years of general upper secondary education. The extent to 
which this had an impact on mean education is however dubious, since most 
children already obtained 9 years of schooling. 
In 1971, compulsory education was extended from seven to nine years which 
was implemented in 1972. Furthermore, a new act on the Folkeskole was 
adopted in 1975. The aim of the new act was to create equal opportunities for 
all pupils and the result was the introduction of nine years of comprehensive 
primary and lower secondary education - combined with an additional optional 
10th year and an optional pre-school class. 
School starts at the age of 7 (the school year ran from April to April; since 
1958, it ran from August to August). There is some disagreement in the 
literature on the timing of the expansion of mandatory schooling. Brunello et 
al. (2009) argue that the expansion took place in 1971 and use the birth cohort 
1957 as the first affected cohort. Arendt (2005), on the other hand, has coded 
the expansion as taking place in 1975 with the introduction of the Folkeskole. 
Consequently, the first affected cohort would then be born in 1961. Here, we 
follow Brunello et al. (2009) but present the reduced form results using the 
alternative 1975/1961 coding in the robustness section. 
Sources: Arendt (2005); Bingley et al. (2009); Brunello, Fort and Weber 
(2009) European Commission (2011). 
 
Belgium (1919): 
The government introduced compulsory schooling from age 6 to age 12 for the 
first time with the act of May 19, 1914. The act also stipulated that the upper 
age limit would be further increased to 13 and then to 14 years of age. The law 
was only implemented after the end of World War I; hence, since 1919 the 
school-leaving age was set to 14 years of age.  
Sources: European Commission (2011), Fort (2006), Wielemans (1991). 
 
Netherlands (1928, 1950 and 1973):  
The first legislation making education compulsory was passed in 1900. It 
prescribed 6 years of compulsory education (between the ages of 6 and 12). 
The Act was repeatedly amended in 1921 (from 6 to 7 years), in 1924 (from 7 
to 6 years), in 1928 (from 6 to 7 years). In 1950, compulsory schooling was 
further increased from 7 to 9 years.  
The Compulsory Education Act 1975 extended compulsory schooling years 
requiring children to attend school full-time between the ages of 6 and 16. 
This meant that also 15-year olds had to follow full-time education. The 
increase in the compulsory school leaving age was accompanied by an 
extension of three-year lower vocational programs to four years. The reform 
therefore incorporated that all schools of lower vocational education should 
implement a second general year. In this year the curriculum ought to include 
at least 20 weekly lessons in general training. The implementation of the 
extension of lower vocational education started in 1973. Since August 1, 1973 
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all lower vocational programs had a length of four years. Therefore, students 
born on or after August 1, 1959 therefore had to follow ten years of full-time 
education. This is also the first cohort of students to encounter a complete 
four-year lower vocational education regime. 
In 1985 the lower age limit for compulsory schooling was lowered from six to 
five. Children must now attend school full time from the age of five for at least 
12 full school years and, in any event, until the end of the school year in which 
they turn 16. 
Sources: European Commission (2011); Levin and Plug (1999); Murtin and 
Viarengo  (2011); Osterbeek and Webbink (2004). 
 
France (1936 and 1967): 
The Zay reform increased the minimal school leaving age from 13 to 14 years 
of age raising the number of compulsory schooling years from 7 to 8. The 
reform thus affected all children that were 13 years of age suggesting that the 
first cohort potentially affected by the reform was born in 1923. 
1967, which extended compulsory education by two more years. The reform 
affected all individuals that were 14 in 1967; hence, the first affected cohort is 
born in 1953. 
Sources: Albouy and Lequien (2009); Grenet (2011) for the second reform. 
 
England and Wales (1947 and 1973) and Scotland (1946 and 1976): 
The Education Act in 1944 known as the Butler Act established the basic legal 
framework governing decisions about school-leaving. The compulsory 
schooling laws specify the maximum age by which children must start school 
(which is 5) and the minimum age at which children can leave school in 
England and Wales as well as Scotland. A Ministerial order later in 1944 
specified that from April 1, 1947 onwards it made education up to the age of 
15 compulsory and provided for the school-leaving age to be raised at a later 
date to 16. The increase to 16 years was implemented in England and Wales in 
1973. As a consequence, the 1947 reform raised the number of compulsory 
schooling years from 8 to 9 and affected all cohorts born after April 1933. The 
reform in 1973 change raised it to 10 years and affected all cohorts born 
September 1957 or later.  
Sources: Clark and Royer (2010); Harmon and Walker (1995); Micklewright 
et al. (1989); Murtin and Viarengo (2011). 
 
Northern Ireland (1957 and 1972):  
The 1947 Education Act in Northern Ireland was closely modeled on Britain's 
Butler Act. It raised the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15. However, 
in Northern Ireland political opposition delayed the implementation of the law 
until 1957. Therefore, the first cohort affected by the reform is born in 1943. 
The reform in 1972 was again modeled after the reform in England and Wales.    
Sources: Eurydice (2011); Oreopoulos (2006). 
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Sweden (1962):  
In 1962 the Riksdag decided to introduce the new 9 years compulsory school 
(grundskolan). The law was preceded by extensive experimentation, where 
changes in compulsory schooling years were implemented stepwise at the 
municipal level between 1949 and 1962. In 1961, about 25 percent of the 
municipalities were assigned to the new system. The experimentation followed 
a proposal by a parliamentary committee in 1948 to replace the compulsory 7 
school years and junior secondary school with a nine-year compulsory 
comprehensive school. The national implementation took place in 1962 but 
the cohort from which the new school system was implemented varied 
between municipalities. Some implemented the new system for all cohorts up 
to those who were in fifth grade at the time. Others, however, implemented it 
starting only with the cohort of pupils who were in first grade in 1962. Here, 
we follow Brunello, Fort and Weber (2009) and define all the individuals born 
after 1950 as potentially affected by the reform. 
Sources: Brunello, Fort and Weber (2009); Eurydice (2011); Holmlund 
(2007); Meghir and Palme (2005). 
 
Italy (1963):  
The first relevant reform (the No. 1859 act, December 31, 1962) prescribes the 
unification of the previous scuola media and scuola di avviamento 
professionale in a single compulsory scuola media. Compulsory schooling 
was raised from 5 to 8 years such that children remained in school until age 
15. The reform was passed at the end of 1962 and was implemented in 1963. 
Hence, the reform affected all individuals born in 1951 or later. We thus code 
the first affected cohort as 1949 (which had to stay in school one year longer).   
Source: Brandolini and Cipollone (2002). 
 
Austria (1966):  
In 1962, the parliament amended the constitution to reorganize the 
responsibilities in education and school administration 
(Schulverfassungsnovelle or School Act Amendment of 1962). Several federal 
education acts followed in 1962, among them the Schulpflichtgesetz which 
was implemented in 1966. The reform increased compulsory schooling from 8 
to 9 years. Since school age starts at age 6, the timing suggests that the first 
cohort affected was born in 1953. However, individuals born in 1952 who 
might have already left school when the reform was introduced were required 
to go back to school and complete the additional year.  
Sources: Bundesgesetzblatt Nr. 241/1962, 8. August 1962; Moravec (1996); 
Murtin and Viarengo (2011). 
 
Spain (1970): 
Compulsory schooling was introduced with the Public Instruction Act (Ley 
Moyano) in 1857 requiring children to attend school from age 6 to 14. 
Elementary education was free and compulsory from age 6 to 9. Enforcement 
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however, seems to have been poor (esp. in agricultural areas) and the number 
of places in schools was typically smaller than the number of school-age 
children. 
A basic reform of the highly fragmented Spanish education system occurred 
with the Ley General de Educación y Financiamiento de la Reforma 
Educativa (General Act on Education and Financing of Educational 
Reform).in 1970. The new General Education System introduced the common 
school (educacion general básica) which offered 8 years of schooling (the 
school year runs from mid-September to the end of June). Schooling from age 
6 to 14 became compulsory and free. The law affected all children that were 
age 13 in 1970 – hence, the first affected cohort is born 1957. 
Sources: European Commission (2011), McNair (1981); Pons and Gonzalo 
(2002). 
 
Ireland (1972):  
The content of the curriculum between 1922 and 1971 was based on the reality 
that schooling would cease for many children at age 14. In 1967, new policy 
departures in relation to both first and second level were to transform the role 
of primary schools in the educational system. Post-primary education was to 
be made available to all children without payment of fees. Transfer from 
primary to post-primary education occurred at age 12 or more and compulsory 
education was extended to age 15 by 1972. 
Sources: European Commission (2011), Murtin and Viarengo (2009). 
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Table 1: Compulsory Schooling Reforms in Europe 
 
Country 
Year reform 
was 
implemented 
First 
cohort 
affected 
Change in 
minimum 
schooling 
level 
Change in 
the 
number of 
years 
Male 20-year 
mortality for 
first cohort 
affected 
Female 20-
year mortality 
for first cohort 
affected 
       
Denmark 1903 1890 7 to 9 2 0.083 0.085 
Belgium 1919 1910 3 to 8 5 0.085 0.063 
Netherlands 1928 1917 6 to 7 1 0.052 0.033 
France 1937 1923 7 to 8 1 0.095 0.054 
Scotland 1946 1932 8 to 9 1 0.028 0.019 
England and Wales 1947 1933 8 to 9 1 0.022 0.014 
Netherlands 1950 1938 7 to 9 2 0.020 0.011 
Northern Ireland 1957 1943 8 to 9 1 0.028 0.013 
Sweden 1962 1950 8 to 9 1 0.024 0.011 
Italy 1963 1949 5 to 8 3 0.022 0.011 
Austria 1966 1953 8 to 9 1 0.034 0.015 
France 1967 1953 8 to 10 2 0.035 0.014 
Spain 1970 1957 6 to 8 2 0.029 0.010 
Ireland 1972 1958 8 to 9 1 0.022 0.009 
Northern Ireland 1972 1958 9 to 10 1 0.028 0.011 
Denmark 1971 1957 7 to 9 2 0.028 0.012 
England and Wales 1973 1958 9 to 10 1 0.019 0.009 
Netherlands 1973 1959 9 to 10 1 0.019 0.009 
Scotland 1976 1958 9 to 10 1 0.023 0.011 
       
Sources: see the data appendix for a description of each compulsory schooling reform. Mortality rates in the  last two  
columns are based on data from the Human Mortality Database (2011).  
 
Table 2: Effect of Compulsory Schooling Reforms on Male Mortality  
          
Country Year OR (20-year) 95%-CI OR (30-year) 95%-CI OR (40-year) 95%-CI OR (50-year) 95%-CI 
  
  
      Denmark 1903 0.982 (0.905, 1.065) 0.991 (0.949, 1.035) 1.007 (0.957, 1.060) 0.992 (0.956, 1.029) 
Belgium 1919 0.903 (0.848, 0.961) 0.947 (0.913, 0.983) 0.956 (0.933, 0.980) 0.959 (0.939, 0.981) 
Netherlands 1928 0.949 (0.824, 1.094) 0.950 (0.880, 1.024) 0.973 (0.933, 1.015) 0.992 (0.965, 1.020) 
France 1937 1.348 (1.048, 1.734) 1.216 (1.023, 1.444) 1.129 (1.015, 1.255) 1.081 (1.002, 1.166) 
Scotland 1946 1.016 (0.942, 1.096) 0.957 (0.907, 1.009) 0.974 (0.947, 1.003) 1.016 (0.990, 1.042) 
England and Wales 1947 0.935 (0.783, 1.116) 0.943 (0.867, 1.025) 0.969 (0.924, 1.015) 1.013 (0.984, 1.043) 
Netherlands 1950 0.981 (0.913, 1.054) 0.958 (0.919, 0.999) 0.938 (0.900, 0.978) 
  Northern Ireland 1957 0.926 (0.871, 0.983) 1.047 (0.946, 1.158) 1.037 (0.920, 1.170) 
  Sweden 1962 0.983 (0.919, 1.052) 0.973 (0.932, 1.015) 
    Italy 1963 1.025 (0.969, 1.085) 1.016 (0.957, 1.078) 
    Austria 1966 0.935 (0.876, 0.998) 0.940 (0.875, 1.010) 
    France 1967 0.951 (0.927, 0.976) 0.979 (0.939, 1.021) 
    Spain 1970 0.984 (0.939, 1.032) 0.979 (0.934, 1.025) 
    Ireland  1972 0.973 (0.909, 1.042)   
Northern Ireland 1972 0.943 (0.864, 1.029)       
England and Wales 1973 0.984 (0.971, 0.998)       
Netherlands 1973 1.027 (0.959, 1.100)       
Denmark 1971 1.064 (0.920, 1.229) 1.003 (0.887, 1.134)         
Scotland 1976 0.938 (0.885, 0.994)       
          
Pooled Estimates 
 
0.972 (0.954, 0.990) 0.972 (0.957, 0.988) 0.974 (0.952, 0.997) 0.999 (0.999, 1.024) 
         
Notes: The table shows reduced-form estimates of the 19 compulsory schooling reforms on 20-year, 30-year, 40-year and 50-year mortality for men. The numbers (in columns labeled 
“OR”) are the coefficient on the reform dummy (from estimating equation(1) separately for each country) and convert the estimate to exp(β) to represent the effect on the odds of dying 
(and not the log odds ratio as in equation (1)). The upper and lower bound of the corresponding 95% confidence intervals are also reported in brackets next to the estimate. The pooled 
estimate is from a meta-analytic model using random effects to construct weights for each reform (see Section 3.3 for further details). Statistically significant effects are marked in bold.  
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Table 3: Effect of Compulsory Schooling Reforms on Female Mortality 
          
Country Year OR (20-year) 95%-CI OR (30-year) 95%-CI OR (40-year) 95%-CI OR (50-year) 95%-CI 
  
  
      Denmark 1903 1.05 (0.995, 1.108) 1.017 (0.974, 1.063) 0.996 (0.969, 1.025) 1.030 (1.005, 1.056) 
Belgium 1919 1.005 (0.943, 1.072) 1.026 (0.975, 1.079) 1.040 (0.997, 1.084) 1.000 (0.978, 1.023) 
Netherlands 1928 0.891 (0.841, 0.945) 0.941 (0.900, 0.983) 0.947 (0.921, 0.974) 0.987 (0.972, 1.002) 
France 1937 1.082 (0.954, 1.226) 1.041 (0.955, 1.134) 1.016 (0.956, 1.081) 1.005 (0.965, 1.047) 
Scotland 1946 0.999 (0.959, 1.040) 1.033 (0.994, 1.074) 0.986 (0.943, 1.031) 0.985 (0.955, 1.016) 
England and Wales 1947 1.002 (0.974, 1.031) 1.006 (0.971, 1.042) 1.001 (0.969, 1.034) 1.032 (1.017, 1.047) 
Netherlands 1950 0.935 (0.839, 1.041) 0.964 (0.925, 1.005) 0.989 (0.934, 1.047) 
  Northern Ireland 1957 0.957 (0.799, 1.146) 0.966 (0.918, 1.016) 0.937 (0.851, 1.032) 
  Sweden 1962 1.115 (0.981, 1.267) 1.014 (0.948, 1.086) 
    Italy 1963 0.983 (0.931, 1.038) 0.998 (0.958, 1.041) 
    Austria 1966 1.026 (0.953, 1.104) 1.001 (0.953, 1.052) 
    France 1967 0.967 (0.918, 1.018) 0.959 (0.925, 0.994) 
    Spain 1970 1.018 (0.934, 1.108) 1.023 (0.984, 1.064) 
    Ireland 1972 0.934 (0.845, 1.032) 
      Northern Ireland 1972 0.878 (0.791, 0.975) 
      England Wales 1973 0.994 (0.956, 1.034) 
      Netherlands 1973 0.995 (0.940, 1.054) 
      Denmark 1971 0.968 (0.801, 1.170) 1.044 (0.927, 1.177) 
    Scotland 1976 0.986 (0.912, 1.065) 
  
        
  
  
      Pooled Estimates 
 
0.988 (0.968, 1.009) 0.997 (0.980, 1.014) 0.991 (0.968, 1.014) 1.007 (0.988, 1.027) 
         
Notes: The table shows reduced-form estimates of the 19 compulsory schooling reforms on 20-year, 30-year, 40-year and 50-year mortality for women. The numbers (in columns 
labeled “OR”) are the coefficients on the reform dummy β (from estimating equation(1) separately for each country) converted to exp(β). The numbers thus represent the effect on the 
odds of dying (and not the log odds ratio as in equation (1)). The upper and lower bound of the corresponding 95% confidence intervals are also reported in brackets next to the 
estimate. The pooled estimate is from a meta-analytic model using random effects to construct weights for each reform (see Section 3.3 for further details). Statistically significant 
effects are marked in bold. 
Table 4: Effect of Compulsory Schooling Reforms on Years of Schooling  
 
Country 
Reform 
Year  
Change in 
compulsory 
schooling Gender  
Our estimates Estimates from the literature 
First stage 
for 2SLS 
Standard 
error First stage 
Standard 
error Source  
         
Netherlands 1928 6 to 7 Men 1.745 (3.480) 0.669 (0.109) Kippersluis et al. (2011) 
Netherlands 1928 6 to 7 Women  1.173 (0.707) no effect  not reported Kippersluis et al. (2011) 
France 1937 7 to 8 All 
  
0.110 (0.064) Albouy and Lequien (2009) 
France 1937 7 to 8 Men -1.788 (1.642) 
   France 1937 7 to 8 Women  0.161 (0.880) 
   England and Wales 1947 8 to 9 Men 0.421 (0.645) 0.420 (0.062) Clark and Royer (2010) 
England and Wales 1947 8 to 9 Women  0.425 (0.460) 0.527 (0.054) Clark and Royer (2010) 
Great Britain  1947 8 to 9 All 
  
0.436 (0.071) Oreopoulos (2006) 
Netherlands 1950 7 to 9 Men -0.617 (0.795) -0.399 (0.564) Levin and Plug (1999) 
Netherlands 1950 7 to 9 Women  0.342 (0.634) 
   Northern Ireland 1957 8 to 9 All 
  
0.391 (0.073) Oreopoulos (2006) 
Sweden 1962 8 to 9 All 
  
0.298 (0.075) Meghir and Palme (2005) 
Sweden 1962 8 to 9 Men -0.014 (0.539) 0.252 (0.081) Meghir and Palme (2005) 
Sweden 1962 8 to 9 Women  -0.325 (0.476) 0.339 (0.105) Meghir and Palme (2005) 
Italy  1963 5 to 8 Men 0.581 (0.854)    
Italy  1963 5 to 8 Women  -0.095 (0.710) 0.190 (0.035) Brandolini and Cippolone (2011) 
Austria 1966 8 to 9 Men 1.551 (0.769) 
   Austria 1966 8 to 9 Women  0.943 (0.615) 
   France 1967 8 to 10 All 
  
0.280 (0.063) Albouy and Lequien (2009) 
France 1967 8 to 10 Men 0.348 (0.692) 0.263 (0.025) Grenet (2011) 
France 1967 8 to 10 Women  1.271 (0.617) 0.274 (0.035) Grenet (2011) 
Spain  1970 6 to 8 Men 1.292 (0.843) 0.720    (0.274) Pons and Gonzalo (2002) 
Spain  1970 6 to 8 Women  0.824 (0.821) 
   Denmark  1971 7 to 9 Men 0.450 (0.681) 0.262 (0.285) Arendt (2005) 
Denmark  1971 7 to 9 Women  -0.161 (0.667) 0.166 (0.302) Arendt (2005) 
Ireland  1972 8 to 9 Men 0.069 (0.597) 
   Ireland  1972 8 to 9 Women  0.477 (0.520) 
   England and Wales 1973 9 to 10 Men 1.078 (0.599) 0.267 (0.028) Grenet (2011) 
England and Wales 1973 9 to 10 Men 1.078 (0.599) 0.318 (0.049) Clark and Royer (2010) 
England and Wales 1973 9 to 10 Women  0.427 (0.473) 0.310 (0.022) Grenet (2011) 
England and Wales 1973 9 to 10 Women  0.427 (0.473) 0.252 (0.050) Clark and Royer (2010) 
Netherlands 1973 9 to 10 Men 0.324 (0.830) 
   Netherlands 1973 9 to 10 Women  1.173 (0.707) 
   
 
     
   Pooled Estimates 
  
Men 0.42 (0.200) 
      Women 0.35  (0.161)    
Notes: The table shows the first-stage of compulsory schooling laws on education. The coefficients are from estimating equation (1) separately 
by country and gender where the dependent variable is years of schooling completed. The set of cohorts is restricted to 10 cohorts above and 
below the reform threshold. The right-hand side of the table shows first-stage estimates reported in the literature for each reform and the 
respective sources.  
Table 5: Effect of Compulsory Schooling Reforms on 30-Year Mortality  
(Two-Sample 2SLS and Reduced-form Estimates) 
          
 
 Men Women 
Country Year Two-Sample 2SLS  Reduced-Form  Two-Sample 2SLS Reduced-Form  
 
 OR (30-year) 95%-CI OR (30-year) 95%-CI OR (40-year) 95%-CI OR (50-year) 95%-CI 
  
  
      Netherlands 1928 0.988 (0.949, 1.029) 0.950 (0.873, 1.033) 0.965 (0.883, 1.055) 0.941 (0.896, 0.988) 
France 1937   
  
0.932 (0.741, 1.172) 1.041 (0.946, 1.145) 
England and Wales 1947 0.864 (0.599, 1.246) 0.943 (0.858, 1.035) 1.012 (0.959, 1.067) 1.006 (0.967, 1.046) 
Netherlands 1950   
  
0.913 (0.746, 1.119) 0.964 (0.920, 1.010) 
Austria 1966 0.950 (0.926, 0.975) 0.940 (0.869, 1.017) 1.002 (0.920, 1.092) 1.001 (0.948, 1.057) 
France 1967 1.083 (0.786, 1.491) 0.979 (0.936, 1.024) 0.979 (0.958, 1.000) 0.959 (0.922, 0.997) 
  
  
      Pooled Estimates 
 
0.961 (0.940, 0.982) 0.963 (0.931, 0.995) 0.982 (0.964, 1.001) 0.978 (0.953, 1.003) 
  
  
      Notes: The table shows two sample 2SLS and reduced-form estimates of compulsory schooling reforms on 30-year mortality for men (left-hand side) and women (right-hand side). 
The set of compulsory schooling reforms is restricted to reforms for which we have data on both education and 30-year mortality rates and reforms with a positive first-stage (see 
Table 4). The numbers (in columns labeled “OR”) are the coefficient on the reform dummy β (from estimating equation(1) separately for each country and gender) converted to exp(β). 
The coefficient thus represents the effect on the odds of dying (and not the log odds ratio as in equation (1)). The upper and lower bound of the corresponding 95% confidence 
intervals are also reported in brackets next to the estimate. The pooled estimate is from a meta-analytic model using fixed effects to construct weights for each reform (see Section 3.3 
for further details). Statistically significant effects are marked in bold. 
Figure 1: Reduced-form Estimates of Mandatory Schooling Reforms on 20-year Mortality Rates (Men) 
 
Notes: The figure summarizes the reduced-form effects of 19 compulsory schooling reforms on the odds of men dying between the ages 18  
and 38 (conditional on surviving to age 18). The point estimates (represented in the figure as a grey square) are constructed by estimating  
equation (1) and converting the resulting coefficient β to exp(β). The corresponding confidence intervals are represented as a horizontal line.  
The size of each square indicates the weight of each reform in the pooled estimation (with larger squares indicating a higher weight). The I2- 
statistic (in percentages) reflects the degree of heterogeneity of estimates. According to the p value, we can reject the null that there is no 
heterogeneity across studies. The pooled estimate (using random reform effects to construct the weights) is shown as the dashed line.           
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Figure 2: Reduced-form Estimates of Mandatory Schooling Reforms on 20-year Mortality Rates (Women) 
 
  Notes: The figure summarizes the reduced-form effects of 19 compulsory schooling reforms on the odds of men dying between the ages 18  
  and 38 (conditional on surviving to age 18). The point estimates (represented in the figure as a grey square) are constructed by estimating  
  equation (1) and converting the resulting coefficient β to exp(β). The corresponding confidence intervals are represented as a horizontal line.  
  The size of each square indicates the weight of each reform in the pooled estimation (with larger squares indicating a higher weight). The  
  I2 statistic (in percentages) reflects the degree of heterogeneity of estimates. According to the p value, we can reject the null that there is no  
  heterogeneity across studies. The pooled estimate (using random reform effects to construct the weights) is shown as the dashed line.           
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Figure 3: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Education on 20-year Mortality Rates (Men) 
 
 
                        Notes: The figure summarizes the two-sample 2SLS effects of 10 compulsory schooling reforms on the odds of men dying between the ages 18  
                           and 38 (conditional on surviving to age 18). The point estimates (represented in the figure as a grey square) are constructed by estimating equation  
                          (1) and converting the resulting coefficient β to exp(β). The corresponding confidence intervals are represented as a horizontal line. The size of each  
                           square indicates the weight of each reform in the pooled estimation (with larger squares indicating a higher weight). The I2 statistic (in percentages)  
                           reflects the degree of heterogeneity of estimates. According to the p value, we cannot reject the null that there is no   heterogeneity across studies.  
                           The pooled estimate (using fixed reform effects to construct the weights) is shown as the dashed line.   
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Figure 4: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Education on 20-year Mortality Rates (Women) 
 
                    Notes: The figure summarizes the two-sample 2SLS effects of 10 compulsory schooling reforms on the odds of women dying between the ages 18  
                      and 38 (conditional on surviving to age 18). The point estimates (represented in the figure as a grey square) are constructed by estimating equation  
                      (1) and converting the resulting coefficient β to exp(β). The corresponding confidence intervals are represented as a horizontal line. The size of each  
                      square indicates the weight of each reform in the pooled estimation (with larger squares indicating a higher weight). The I2 statistic (in percentages)  
                      reflects the degree of heterogeneity of estimates. According to the p value, we cannot reject the null that there is no   heterogeneity across studies.  
                      The pooled estimate (using fixed reform effects to construct the weights) is shown as the dashed line.           
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Table A1: Reduced-form Estimates of Compulsory Schooling Reforms on 20-Year Mortality  
(Subset of Reforms with Reliable First-Stage) 
    
  
Men Women 
 Country Reform Year  OR (20 year) 95% Confidence Interval OR (20 year) 95% Confidence Interval 
        
Netherlands  1928 0.949 0.824 1.094 0.891 0.841 0.945 
France 1937 
   
1.082 0.954 1.226 
England and Wales  1947 0.935 0.783 1.116 1.002 0.974 1.031 
Netherlands 1950 
   
0.935 0.839 1.041 
Austria  1966 0.935 0.876 0.998 1.026 0.953 1.104 
France  1967 0.951 0.927 0.976 0.967 0.918 1.018 
Spain  1970 0.984 0.939 1.032 1.018 0.934 1.108 
Ireland  1972 0.973 0.909 1.042 0.934 0.845 1.032 
England and Wales 1973 0.984 0.971 0.998 0.994 0.956 1.034 
Netherlands 1973 1.027 0.959 1.100 0.995 0.94 1.054 
Denmark  1971 1.064 0.920 1.229 
           
Pooled Estimates 
 
0.974 0.957 0.992 0.978 0.949 1.008 
        
Notes: The table shows reduced-form estimates of the compulsory schooling reforms on 20-year mortality for men (left-hand side) and women 
(right-hand side). We only include reforms for which we have data on education and if we find a positive first-stage (see Table 4). The numbers (in 
columns labeled “OR”) are the coefficients on the reform dummy β (from estimating equation(1) separately for each country) converted to exp(β). 
The numbers thus represent the effect on the odds of dying (and not the log odds ratio as in equation (1)). The upper and lower bound of the 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals are reported in the columns next to the estimate. The pooled estimate is from a meta-analytic model 
using random effects to construct weights for each reform (see Section 3.3 for further details). Statistically significant effects are marked in bold. 
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Table A2: Robustness Checks for Male 20-Year Mortality (Reduced-form Estimates) 
  
Bandwidth +/- 
5 cohorts 
 Bandwidth 
+/- 3 cohorts  
Local Linear 
Polynomial  
Global Cubic 
Polynomial  
Country Year OR (20-year) 95%-CI OR (20-year) 95%-CI OR (20-year) 95%-CI OR (20-year) 95%-CI 
  
  
      Denmark 1903 1.018 (0.935, 1.108) 1.017 (0.953, 1.086) 1.031 (0.988, 1.076) 0.991 (0.930, 1.057) 
Belgium 1919 0.957 (0.910, 1.006) 0.973 (0.921, 1.029) 1.025 (0.973, 1.080) 0.934 (0.861, 1.013) 
Netherlands 1928 1.127 (1.070, 1.187) 1.142 (1.070, 1.219) 1.242 (1.082, 1.425) 1.000 (0.862, 1.161) 
France 1937 1.395 (0.824, 2.362) 1.556 (1.095, 2.211) 0.953 (0.768, 1.229) 1.056 (0.846, 1.317) 
Scotland 1946 1.045 (0.974, 1.121) 1.025 (0.965, 1.088) 1.203 (1.094, 1.321) 1.065 (0.983, 1.153) 
England and Wales 1947 0.987 (0.912, 1.069) 0.877 (0.714, 1.078) 1.414 (1.096, 1.824) 1.058 (0.898, 1.247) 
Netherlands 1950 1.033 (0.991, 1.076) 1.058 (1.023, 1.096) 1.060 (0.996, 1.129) 0.993 (0.904, 1.092) 
Northern Ireland 1957 0.925 (0.860, 0.995) 0.938 (0.881, 0.997) 0.957 (0.927, 0.988) 0.934 (0.894, 0.975) 
Sweden 1962 0.992 (0.929, 1.060) 0.962 (0.890, 1.041) 1.053 (1.005, 1.103) 1.002 (0.948, 1.058) 
Italy 1963 0.979 (0.891, 1.077) 0.987 (0.915, 1.065) 0.953 (0.911, 0.997) 1.010 (0.963, 1.058) 
Austria 1966 0.937 (0.848, 1.035) 0.929 (0.844, 1.022) 1.012 (0.961, 1.065) 0.958 (0.906, 1.013) 
France 1967 0.985 (0.962, 1.008) 0.983 (0.956, 1.010) 1.086 (1.034, 1.142) 0.982 (0.963, 1.002) 
Spain 1970 0.980 (0.878, 1.094) 0.952 (0.887, 1.021) 1.213 (1.099, 1.339) 1.041 (0.982, 1.104) 
Ireland 1972 0.945 (0.858, 1.041) 0.940 (0.868, 1.018) 1.003 (0.96, 1.049) 0.983 (0.911, 1.061) 
Northern Ireland 1972 0.963 (0.855, 1.084) 1.060 (0.880, 1.277) 0.835 (0.763, 0.914) 0.907 (0.827, 0.995) 
England Wales 1973 0.979 (0.958, 1.001) 0.995 (0.977, 1.014) 0.979 (0.962, 0.996) 0.983 (0.949, 1.018) 
Netherlands 1973 1.088 (0.991, 1.194) 1.110 (1.035, 1.192) 1.002 (0.957, 1.048) 1.015 (0.955, 1.080) 
Denmark 1971 1.024 (0.776, 1.352) 1.120 (0.945, 1.327) 0.961 (0.859, 1.074) 1.031 (0.901, 1.181) 
Scotland 1976 0.999 (0.948, 1.052) 0.991 (0.936, 1.050) 0.948 (0.919, 0.978) 0.937 (0.888, 0.990) 
  
  
      Pooled Estimates 
 
0.999 (0.977, 1.022) 0.997 (0.979, 1.031) 1.019 (0.989, 1.051) 0.984 (0.967, 1.000) 
         
Notes: The table shows reduced-form estimates of the compulsory schooling reforms on 20-year mortality for men using four alternative specifications. The first two use only 5 and 3 
cohorts above and below the threshold when estimating equation (1). The second two specifications use a local linear polynomial and a global cubic polynomial to adjust for mortality 
trends. The numbers (in columns labeled “OR”) are the coefficients on the reform dummy β (from estimating equation(1) separately for each country) converted to exp(β). The 
numbers thus represent the effect on the odds of dying (and not the log odds ratio as in equation (1)). The upper and lower bound of the corresponding 95% confidence intervals are 
reported in brackets next to the estimate. The pooled estimate is from a meta-analytic model using random effects to construct weights for each reform (see Section 3.3 for further 
details). Statistically significant effects are marked in bold.  
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Table A3: Robustness Checks for Female 20-Year Mortality (Reduced-form Estimates) 
  
Bandwidth +/- 
5 cohorts 
 Bandwidth 
+/- 3 cohorts  
Local Linear 
Polynomial  
Global Cubic 
Polynomial  
Country Year OR (20-year) 95%-CI OR (20-year) 95%-CI OR (20-year) 95%-CI OR (20-year) 95%-CI 
  
  
      Denmark 1903 1.033 (0.948, 1.125) 1.037 (0.789, 1.362) 1.042 (0.995, 1.091) 1.037 (0.789, 1.362) 
Belgium 1919 1.045 (0.979, 1.116) 1.136 (1.098, 1.175) 1.001 (0.946, 1.058) 1.136 (1.098, 1.175) 
Netherlands 1928 0.991 (0.874, 1.123) 0.977 (0.898, 1.062) 0.940 (0.828, 1.068) 0.977 (0.898, 1.062) 
France 1937 1.077 (0.789, 1.470) 1.059 (0.608, 1.844) 0.955 (0.790, 1.155) 1.059 (0.608, 1.844) 
Scotland 1946 1.005 (0.887, 1.140) 1.024 (0.733, 1.431) 0.974 (0.878, 1.081) 1.024 (0.733, 1.431) 
England and Wales 1947 1.032 (0.982, 1.083) 1.039 (0.955, 1.130) 1.008 (0.934, 1.088) 1.039 (0.955, 1.130) 
Netherlands 1950 0.944 (0.802, 1.112) 1.008 (0.787, 1.293) 0.962 (0.880, 1.050) 1.008 (0.787, 1.293) 
Northern Ireland 1957 1.221 (1.076, 1.385) 1.331 (1.273, 1.391) 0.968 (0.833, 1.126) 1.331 (1.273, 1.391) 
Sweden 1962 1.081 (0.847, 1.380) 1.333 (0.610, 2.915) 1.098 (0.964, 1.252) 1.333 (0.610, 2.915) 
Italy 1963 0.965 (0.899, 1.035) 0.900 (0.689, 1.176) 0.983 (0.941, 1.028) 0.900 (0.689, 1.176) 
Austria 1966 1.000 (0.907, 1.103) 0.979 (0.667, 1.437) 1.018 (0.946, 1.095) 0.979 (0.667, 1.437) 
France 1967 0.981 (0.896, 1.074) 0.920 (0.876, 0.966) 0.980 (0.941, 1.021) 0.920 (0.876, 0.966) 
Spain 1970 0.983 (0.914, 1.058) 0.911 (0.906, 0.917) 1.049 (0.955, 1.153) 0.911 (0.906, 0.917) 
Ireland 1972 0.955 (0.858, 1.063) 0.973 (0.639, 1.482) 0.969 (0.860, 1.093) 0.973 (0.639, 1.482) 
Northern Ireland 1972 0.923 (0.768, 1.110) 0.841 (0.722, 0.978) 0.878 (0.761, 1.012) 0.841 (0.722, 0.978) 
England Wales 1973 0.951 (0.906, 0.999) 0.953 (0.822, 1.106) 0.985 (0.942, 1.030) 0.953 (0.822, 1.106) 
Netherlands 1973 0.966 (0.891, 1.048) 0.893 (0.861, 0.927) 0.990 (0.942, 1.041) 0.893 (0.861, 0.927) 
Denmark 1971 1.070 (0.822, 1.393) 1.280 (0.727, 2.253) 0.964 (0.829, 1.122) 1.280 (0.727, 2.253) 
Scotland 1976 0.925 (0.831, 1.029) 0.976 (0.621, 1.534) 0.976 (0.892, 1.067) 0.976 (0.621, 1.534) 
  
  
      Pooled Estimates 
 
0.983 (0.965, 1.001) 1.001 (0.924, 1.085) 0.994 (0.978, 1.010) 1.001 (0.924, 1.085) 
         
Notes: The table shows reduced-form estimates of compulsory schooling reforms on 20-year mortality for women using four alternative specifications. The first two use only 5 and 3 
cohorts above and below the threshold when estimating equation (1). The second two specifications use a local linear polynomial and a global cubic polynomial to adjust for mortality 
trends. See notes to Table A2 for further details. Statistically significant effects are marked in bold.  
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Figure A1: Reduced-form Effects on 20-year Mortality Rates (Men) with 1975 for Danish Reform 
  
              Notes: The figure summarizes the reduced-form effects of 19 compulsory schooling reforms on the odds of men dying between the ages 18  
             and 38 (conditional on surviving to age 18). The point estimates (represented in the figure as a grey square) are constructed by estimating  
             equation (1) and converting the resulting coefficient β to exp(β). The corresponding confidence intervals are represented as a horizontal line.  
             The size of each square indicates the weight of each reform in the pooled estimation (with larger squares indicating a higher weight). The I2- 
             statistic (in percentages) reflects the degree of heterogeneity of estimates. According to the p value, we can reject the null that there is no 
             heterogeneity across studies. The pooled estimate (using random reform effects to construct the weights) is shown as the dashed line.           
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Figure A2: Reduced-form Estimates on 20-year Mortality Rates (Women) with 1975 for Danish Reform 
 
          Notes: The figure summarizes the reduced-form effects of 19 compulsory schooling reforms on the odds of men dying between the ages 18 and 38       
          (conditional on surviving to age 18). The point estimates (represented in the figure as a grey square) are constructed by estimating equation (1) and   
          converting the resulting coefficient β to exp(β). The corresponding confidence intervals are represented as a horizontal line. The size of each square  
          indicates the weight of each reform in the pooled estimation (with larger squares indicating a higher weight). The I2-statistic (in percentages) reflects the  
          degree of heterogeneity of estimates. According to the p value, we can reject the null that there is no heterogeneity across studies. The pooled estimate  
          (using random reform effects to construct the weights) is shown as the dashed line.           
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